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Because estate tax liability usually depends on how long one lives, it implicitly provides
annuity income. In the absence of annuity markets, lump-sum estate taxation may be used to achieve
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effectively receiving more than $100,000 a year financed at actuarially fair rates by their tax
payments. According to my calibrations, the insurance effect reduces the marginal cost of funds
(MCF) for the estate tax by as much as 30% and the resulting MCF is within the range of estimates
for the marginal cost of funds for the income tax.
Wojciech Kopczuk
Department of Economics
University of British Columbia




\The trick is to live."
Small business owner Sandy Graus on her strategy for avoiding the estate tax.1
1. Introduction
Should the rich favor the repeal of the estate tax? Not necessarily. By postponing tax payments
until death, estate taxation may act like social security by reducing the present value of lifetime
tax liability the longer one lives. To the extent that people subject to the estate tax do not face
actuarially fair insurance markets,2 it may make perfect sense to raise at least part of tax revenue
in the form of an estate tax. The key insight is that estate taxation can bring about a transfer
from the (ex-post) short-living to long-living individuals. Assuming a risk-neutral government (or,
simply, no aggregate mortality risk), the government may be able to transfer resources between
dierent states of the world at actuarially fair rates without any loss in revenue (and thus without
increasing the present value of taxes paid by a given individual). Consequently, estate taxation
may serve as a substitute for private annuity markets and social security.
The paper makes three basic points. In theory, the estate tax may play an insurance role. In
practice, the actual U.S. estate tax provides a sizable annuity to the estate taxpayers. Furthermore,
the presence of annuity signicantly reduces the eciency cost of this tax instrument.
The basic intuition for understanding the role of taxes imposed on (partially) accidental be-
quests is as follows. Because the estate tax is conditional on death, it has the same 
avor as life
insurance, except with the opposite sign. Individuals who would like to take a short position on
life insurance, but are unable to do so because of market imperfections, should thus welcome con-
verting their tax liability into an estate tax. In particular, the government may be able to make
this conversion actuarially fair because it weighs tax receipts by survival probabilities. As argued
by Bernheim (1991), purchases of life insurance may be used to oset the eects of purchases of
annuities, and vice versa. Thus, estate taxation has an aspect of annuities embedded into it. More
specically, if estate tax payments fall with age (in the present value sense), survival entails tax
savings and therefore the tax provides a positive annuity.
It is widely believed that at least part of the estates that people leave is not planned, but
instead is due to lifetime savings that are not consumed because of uncertainty about the length of
life. This observation has led some to suggest that if taxpayers are lifetime savers only, the estate
tax is quite ecient: there is no behavioral response because no decisions made during lifetime
1Quoted in Newsweek, June 19, 2000 p. 21.
2The price of insurance is actuarially fair if the expected value of the contract is zero.{ 2 {
are distorted. This suggests a \free lunch", a rare phenomenon in economics. At rst blush this
argument seems reasonable, but it contains a fallacy. \Accidental" bequests are a symptom of some
underlying market imperfection (most likely in the annuities markets), and the rst-best solution is
to correct the imperfection (and thereby eliminate accidental bequests altogether). Only when the
rst-best solution is not feasible do accidental bequests arise. Then, 100% taxation of accidental
bequests may have no direct eciency cost, but providing an annuity generates an eciency gain.
The lack of behavioral response when accidental bequests are present is misleading. Compared to
the rst-best optimum (arising when insurance contracts are priced actuarially fairly), relative prices
and individual behavior are distorted. Therefore, compared to the rst-best optimum, taxation of
accidental bequests is not without a welfare loss.
There is, however, a grain of truth behind the argument that taxes imposed on accidental
bequests are particularly ecient. The revenue generated from taxes on accidental bequests can
be used to nance reduced taxes while alive, thereby providing an implicit annuity. This transfer
across dierent states is preferred by consumers who would like to purchase annuities, although it
is limited by the amount of life-cycle saving that individuals are willing to undertake. If it was
possible to commit an individual to save enough to cover any required level of estate tax liability,
estate taxation could be used to achieve the rst-best solution by (1) forcing individuals to save the
right amount in the early periods (it is possible if people have to meet the required level of estate
tax liability) and (2) using tax policy to reallocate resources across dierent states of the world at
actuarially fair rates, so that the resulting allocation is on the utility possibility frontier.
Similar reasoning applies to individuals with a bequest motive. However, in this context it is
easier to provide an incentive mechanism that would make individuals save to meet the required
level of estate tax liability: if a bequest motive is suciently strong, people will want to save to
leave a bequest regardless of the taxes imposed on them. The paper demonstrates that the estate
tax alone may then be used to achieve the rst-best solution, even when the actuarially fair markets
for annuities are non-existent.
Arguably, the Social Security system does not attempt to provide signicant annuities for the
rich. For the highest incomes the replacement rate is 15%, compared to 90% for the lowest one.
Furthermore, a portion of Social Security income is subject to (progressive) income taxation. The
nominal progressive structure of the Social Security benets is mitigated by the lower mortality of
the rich3 and by limiting the maximum amount of income subject to Social Security taxes ($76,200
in 2000). Most importantly, however, the maximum annuity provided by the Social Security system
is small. The Primary Insurance Amount4 (PIA) in 1997 was $1,326 for workers whose earnings
were at or above the maximum amount that counted for contribution and benet purposes each
3See Attanasio and Hoynes (2000) and the papers cited there.
4This is the upper bound of monthly benets per spouse from the Social Security.{ 3 {
year and who retired in 1997 (Social Security Administration 1997, p. 18). It is implausible that
even the maximum annuity payable by the Social Security system fullls the need of the rich to
annuitize. The evidence cited later in the paper suggests that it is also not possible to purchase
private annuities at fair prices. This paper suggests that the presence of estate taxation to some
extent alleviates this problem.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses how the government may provide
annuities in a number of dierent ways, Social Security being just one of them. In particular, it is
possible to replicate any annuity by using stylized estate taxation. In Section 3, it is demonstrated,
in a single individual context, that lump-sum estate taxation can sometimes be used to reach the
rst-best optimum. The main obstacle is the presence of \moral hazard." Using estate taxation
to implement annuities amounts to an ex post payment for the insurance contract, and individuals
may not have the appropriate incentives to hold a large enough estate to nance it. This problem
is inherent if people save only for life-cycle purposes, but I show that it does not arise if bequest
motives are strong enough. Even an estate tax that is not lump-sum still provides an annuity.
In Section 3.1, it is demonstrated that when insurance markets are missing, the optimal marginal
estate tax rate can be positive even when regular lump-sum taxation is possible and people have a
bequest motive.
The last portion of the paper investigates local optimality of the current U.S. estate tax. In
Section 4.1, the amount of annuity embedded in the U.S. estate tax system is quantied. The
following calculations use the concept of the marginal cost of funds (MCF) to pin down the quan-
titative importance of the insurance eect. The calibration suggests that MCF for the estate tax is
of the same order as the marginal cost of funds for the income tax. According to my calculations,
the insurance eect contributes to a reduction in the MCF by between four and thirty-ve percent,
depending mostly on the degree of imperfection in the annuity markets. The last section concludes.
2. Estate Tax as an Insurance Contract
I begin by showing the relationship between streams of annuity and estate tax payments.
Assuming away uncertainty other than mortality risk, dierent dates of death directly correspond
to dierent resolutions of uncertainty, even though the context is intertemporal. A stream of
annuity payments determines the pattern of transfers between dierent states of the world. In a
nutshell, the discussion in this section exploits the possibility of re-timing these transfers without
aecting their stochastic properties.
Consider a representative individual who has probability ps of survival until period s, s =
0;:::;I, with p0 = 1. Suppose that the government wishes to provide a stream of annuity payments
of As, s > 0 (i.e., conditional on survival until period i the individual would receive As), nanced by
tax revenue with a zero revenue requirement in present value. For now, the focus is on the accounting{ 4 {
transformations of the annuity stream, without regard for a potential behavioral response.
Regardless of the details of its implementation, such a policy must involve a stream of expendi-
tures fAsg that occur with probabilities of fpsg, nanced by unconditional tax payments with the
present value of T as of the initial period. Note that, with a single individual and no administrative
costs, provision of fAsg is going to be an actuarially fair contract when the government is risk neu-
tral or there is no aggregate mortality risk: T =
PI
s=1 ps(1+r) sAs, because the government uses
survival rates to discount future expenses. Interestingly, actuarial fairness of such an annuity does
not depend on the lump-sum character of payments. Neither the incentives faced by an individual,
nor the way the revenue is collected and transfers implemented matter, as long as the eective
transfers conditional on dierent resolutions of uncertainty are as given by fAsg.
Such a stream of annuity payments may be structured in many dierent ways. One way
is straightforward: an initial5 tax payment of T followed by subsidies conditional on survival as
it is the case with privately purchased annuities or the actual Social Security system (of course,
the real-life solutions are not necessarily actuarially fair). Many alternative ways of structuring the
annuity payments may be designed by changing the timing of tax payments. Consider, for example,
introducing a tax of (1+r)sT payable in case of death in period s, while holding annuity payments
As as before. Since death occurs with certainty and the present value of tax receipts under any
resolution of uncertainty is exactly T, this is an unconditional tax collecting exactly T. Therefore,
net transfers received are always exactly the same as with explicitly provided annuities.
An implementation of the annuity payments that is most important for this paper relies on
estate taxes and an initial tax combined. In discussion of this policy a simple lemma (demonstrated
in the appendix) will prove helpful.
Lemma 1 Consider two possibilities: (a) a lump-sum tax of Es conditional on dying at the end
of period s; and (b) a lump-sum tax of Es conditional on having survived until period s combined
with a lump-sum transfer of (1 + r)Es conditional on having survived until period s + 1. The sets
of feasible consumption/bequest plans in these two cases are identical.
The idea is to introduce an ex-ante lump-sum tax, and oer a refund only to the survivors. This
lemma thus shows how a tax payment conditional on death may be transformed into payments and
subsidies conditional on survival. Lemma 1 can be used to convert a stream of estate tax payments
into annuities and vice versa. Consider an individual who at his current consumption plan will
pay the estate taxes of Es, s = 0;:::;I, in case of death at the end of period s. His stream of
potential tax payments may be equivalently given as a combination of an initial lump-sum tax and
subsequent (positive or negative) annuity payments.
5What is important is that the tax is due before non-trivial death probabilities arise.{ 5 {
Proposition 1 A stream of estate tax payments fEsgs=0;:::;I is equivalent (i.e., yields the same tax
payments under any resolution of uncertainty) to the initial lump-sum tax of T = E0 and a stream
of annuity payments fAsgs=1;:::;I, where As = (1 + r)Es 1   Es, s = 1;:::;I.
Proof: By Lemma 1, Es is equivalent to a change in As of the amount  Es and a change in As+1
of (1 + r)Es. Aggregating this over s yields the result. Note that it leads to A0 =  E0 which is,
equivalently, a tax in the amount of E0. 2
The proposition states that the estate tax may always be expressed as a combination of a lump-sum
tax and a series of annuity receipts or payments. From the proposition, it is easy to observe that
the positiveness of annuity payments is equivalent to the present value of estate tax payments being
a decreasing function of age at death. This has noteworthy implications. Simply observing the age
prole of estate tax payments determines whether annuity payments are embedded in the estate
tax. Note also that, although the equivalence in terms of budget sets depends on the lump-sum
character of taxes, the decomposition of an estate tax into annuities does not. In other words,
if the stream fEsg arose as the result of a distortionary tax policy, it would still insure the way
an annuity does, although the incentives under the two scenarios might be quite dierent. In
Section 4.1, Proposition 1 is used to quantify the annuity embedded in the U.S. estate tax.
Corollary 1 A stream of annuity payments fAsg and an initial tax of T is equivalent to an estate
tax fEsg dened by E0 = T and Es = (1 + r)Es 1   As.
The corollary simply states that the same transfers that take place under a Social Security system
or private insurance schemes can also follow from a judicious choice of estate tax payments. This
intuition will be used in what follows.
3. Estate Taxation and Imperfect Annuity Markets
A commonly suggested rationale for introducing Social Security is the presence of imperfections
in the insurance markets. The purpose of this section is to show that estate taxation may help to
resolve such market failure. I characterize the optimal estate tax policy and discuss the associated
incentive problems in a formal model with a stylized set of lump-sum instruments available. Most
importantly, I show that lump-sum estate taxation may in some circumstances be used to implement
the rst-best solution.6 In what follows, I take market imperfections as given, without modeling
their underlying cause.7 This serves to highlight the insurance role of estate taxation and establish
that it is indeed an alternative to other means of providing annuities.
6In an earlier version of this paper (Kopczuk 2001) it is demonstrated that when subsidies are possible the rst-best
solution can always be implemented using lump-sum estate taxation.
7One likely source is adverse selection: private markets may then be inecient or cease to exist (Akerlof 1970;
Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976). Government may then increase welfare by forcing everybody to participate and{ 6 {
Suppose that an individual lives for at most two periods, with the probability of dying at the
end of the rst period being 1 p, 0 < p < 1. There is no other uncertainty. There is an exogenously
given level of rst-period income y. The revenue requirement is R, but the government cares only
about the expected present value of payments. There are two types of available tax instruments:
an initial lump-sum tax and a lump-sum (estate) tax that is due when individual dies. What is the
optimal way of collecting the required amount of revenue?
The rst-best solution occurs when markets are actuarially fair, i.e., when the expected value of
insurance contracts is zero. The optimal consumption/bequest plan in this case can be implemented
by annuitizing lifetime consumption and using life insurance for bequests (Yaari 1965).8 The
optimal way of collecting revenue is by unconditional lump-sum taxes. Such a solution will be
compared with the solution when insurance markets are shut down and some alternative tax system
is used.9 The assumption of no insurance markets is made for convenience (as in, e.g., Davies 1981;
Hurd 1989), but the basic idea applies also to a more realistic case of imperfect insurance markets.10
Consider the utility function augmented by a \joy-of-giving" bequest motive,
u(C1) + (1   p)v(B1) + pu(C2) + pv(B2); (1)
where Ci, i = 1;2, is consumption in period i, Bi is the bequest left in case of death at the end of
period i and v() is the utility derived from it. The interest rate is assumed to be zero, and there
is no discounting other than implicitly through the survival rate.11
Suppose rst that the individual does not have a bequest motive so that v(B) = 0. The
budget constraint is simply C1 +C2 = y  T ; where T is the initial lump-sum tax. This should be
contrasted with the budget constraint when annuities are available and priced at p (i.e., actuarially
oering, e.g., insurance at \average" rates to everyone. This market failure has been suggested as a justication for
governmental intervention (Diamond 1977). The publicly provided Social Security benets in the United States and
many other countries limit the maximum amount of retirement income, so that they are unlikely to provide sucient
annuities for the well-o. This is also the group which is most likely to face estate taxation.
8If it is possible to choose a short position on one of these instruments, the optimal solution may be implemented
by using it and regular saving. This equivalence breaks down when markets are imperfect (Bernheim 1991).
9There is a long line of literature dealing with the behavior of a consumer facing mortality risk (see e.g., Yaari
1965; Davies 1981; Abel 1985; Hurd 1989; Bernheim 1991). Some of these papers (Davies 1981; Abel 1985) consider
accidental bequests in isolation, while others (Hurd 1989; Bernheim 1991) allow also for intentional bequests.
10Several studies have argued that private annuities are far from being fairly priced, and possibly should not be
used by optimizing consumers. Friedman and Warshawsky (1990) concluded that annuities are dominated by other
saving instruments. Using more recent data, Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky, and Brown (1999) nd that the expected
present discounted value of annuity pay-out is between 76 and 93 cents, depending on the mortality and interest rate
assumptions. In their simulation, the optimizing consumer should make some use of these imperfect contracts.
11All the results in this section go through without these assumptions, although at the cost of additional notation.{ 7 {
fairly), C1 + pC2 = y   T . As stated, an estate tax would play no role in the consumer's problem,
because it does not in any way aect the budget set. When annuities are available, the optimal




1+p , and the individual always dies with zero wealth. The rst-best
policy is to set the lump-sum tax equal to the revenue requirement, T = R.
When markets for annuities are shut down, the optimal consumption plan features u0(C1) =
pu0(C2). Under the standard assumption of decreasing marginal utility, this implies that C1 > C2,
regardless of the choice of tax instruments. Therefore, state-dependent lump-sum taxation cannot
be used to reach the rst-best allocation. In the optimal tax regime, the estate left in the case of
death after the rst period should be conscated by the government.12 This is well-known, but
interpretation of this result in terms of annuity provision is not: the policy of conscating accidental
bequests provides annuities. By relying in part on the tax imposed on the \accidental" bequest,
the initial lump-sum tax can be set below the revenue requirement and the tax faced ex post by
long-living individuals is reduced. Short-living individuals pay more in taxes (although they do
not care about all of their tax payments) than long-living ones. This transfer is limited by the
amount of saving in the rst period, and it is insucient for attaining the rst-best allocation even
though the estate tax can be nominally set to implement the rst-best annuity (and any other
annuity) using the scheme of Corollary 1. In the life-cycle context, however, there are no incentive
mechanisms that could force the individual to meet the necessary level of estate tax payments. In
a richer setting, however, this problem may be overcome.
One such incentive mechanism may arise in the presence of a bequest motive (from now on,
it is no longer assumed that v(B) = 0). Because the government is trying to provide insurance
nanced by ex post estates, it faces the problem of moral hazard: individuals have an incentive to
spend their estates. However, if the individual cares about leaving a positive bequest, a high estate
tax may make him save enough to meet this requirement.
When markets are actuarially fair, the resulting allocation is the rst-best solution to the
individual's problem. The optimal tax policy is to impose a lump-sum tax collecting the required
revenue. The budget constraint in this case is
C1 + pC2 + (1   p)B1 + pB2 = y   R; (2)
and, assuming an interior solution for bequests, the optimal allocation is characterized by u0(C1) =





Consider now the case when neither annuities nor life insurance are available. Denote by E
the estate tax due in case of death in the rst period (if the estate is smaller than E, it is all
12Of course, it is going to aect the subsequent generation. I do not address the issue of optimal intergenerational
transfers. There are other instruments that may be employed to transfer resources between generations without
distorting life-cycle decisions such as, e.g., debt policy.{ 8 {
conscated). The estate tax in the second period is set to zero. There are two relevant constraints:
the second-period constraint,
C2 + B2 = y   T   C1 ; (3)
and the rst-period resource constraint
B1 + C1 = y   T   E ; (4)
or B1 = 0 and C1  Y   T : (5)
Note that the consumer has an option of leaving no bequest and saving less than the estate tax
due in the rst period. This would increase rst-period consumption above the level possible
while holding bequests positive, by consuming a part of the would-be tax payment of E. The next
proposition shows that when such a possibility may be excluded, it is possible to use estate taxation
to arrive at the rst-best allocation.




T = y  C
1  C
2  B
2, the resulting allocation is the rst-best optimum and the revenue constraint
clears.
Proof: Consider using the stated E and T. Direct inspection of equations (3) and (4) shows
that it makes the rst-best solution feasible. Will it be selected? By assumption, B1 = 0 is
not optimal, because the utility level would be equal to negative innity. By construction, any
allocation (B1;C1;B2;C2) with B1 > 0 in the consumer's budget set satises the individual resource




2, i.e., it is equal
to the revenue collected in the perfect markets setup. Thus, this allocation was also feasible in the
rst-best case, and so the rst-best solution is revealed preferred to it. Therefore, the rst-best
allocation must be the optimum of the problem. 2
Remark 1 The estate tax identied in the proposition is positive. This is because C
2 > 0 and
v0(B
1) = v0(B
2) so that B
1 = B
2.
Proposition 2 is a powerful result. Estate taxation alone is able to correct the imperfection
in the annuities market and push the economy to the rst-best optimum. The tax policy assumes
the role of privately purchased insurance. The estate tax is used to transfer, in an actuarially fair
way, resources from the people who die early to those who live relatively long. This is the same
reallocation of resources between dierent states of the world as the one explicitly occurring in
the rst-best solution via purchases of insurance contracts. As explained in Section 2, it is also
equivalent to appropriately designed publicly provided old-age benets.
This solution has an intriguing feature: the prices of consumption and bequests are not aected
so that, on the surface, the price incentives under the rst-best and estate-tax regimes are dierent.{ 9 {
Why is the same allocation selected in both cases? Essentially, this is the same eect as with Social
Security: an implicit annuity embedded in the estate tax transfers resources between periods.
Mechanically, under estate taxation there are two constraints that describe the budget set. The
way they are stated (equations 3-4), rst-period consumption appears in both of them, so that its
marginal cost re
ects the relative importance of both and is, in a way, endogenous. In the described
solution this \price" replicates the rst-best incentives. Notably, even though an imperfection is
present the proposed solution is not a Pigouvian tax. It is also unlike direct regulation, because
consumers are not explicitly constrained in their decisions. The lack of annuities is better thought
of as a failure on the production side of economy: the technology to convert consumption in one
state of the world to consumption in the other state is not available. Estate taxation provides this
otherwise infeasible technology and moves the economy to the production possibility frontier.
The assumption of v(0) =  1 in Proposition 2 is unnecessarily strong.13 It implies that
individuals always leave a bequest. The proof of Proposition 2 requires only comparing the rst-
best allocation with a corner solution when the estate tax is avoided.
Remark 2 The assumption v(0) =  1 may be weakened. All that is required is that the utility in
the rst-best optimum is greater than the utility from choosing B1 = 0 and the optimal selection of
other variables subject to C1 + C2 + B2 = y   T, with T given in the statement of the proposition.
3.1. Linear Estate Tax
The lump-sum character of assumed instruments was exploited in the proof of eciency of
estate taxation, Proposition 2. A practical estate tax, however, is unlikely to be either age-varying or
lump-sum. Instead, it will be a non-constant function of estates or bequests, E(B), with E0(B) 6= 0.
It is not dicult to show that such a tax will not, in general, be able to implement the rst-best
allocation. To see this, consider the previous setup. In the rst-best optimum, B
1 = B
2: a consumer
who is able to fully annuitize does not choose a time-varying pattern of bequests.14 If this allocation
was feasible to implement using tax policy, the estate tax payments would not depend on the time
of death E(B
1) = E(B
2), and Proposition 1 implies that no annuity is provided by the estate tax
13This assumption is stronger than the more standard assumption of innite marginal utility at zero, because it
implies that the consumer is willing to sacrice discrete amounts of other goods for a dierential change in bequests
at zero. Still, some commonly used utility functions have this feature. For example, the isoelastic utility function
v(x) =
x1 
1  satises this assumption for  > 1.





0(B2). This is the Euler equation, similar to the one that needs to be satised by consumption.
Unless

1+r = 1, bequests are not constant (Yaari 1965). However, the arguments in this section may be easily
adapted to deal with a non-zero interest rate and discounting, without aecting the basic conclusions.{ 10 {
(recall that r = 0). Without a transfer of resources between the states of the world, however, the
rst-best allocation is not feasible, leading to a contradiction.
Existence of the estate tax annuity identied in Proposition 1 does not depend on the lump-
sum character of the tax. Therefore, even a non lump-sum estate tax provides some annuitization,
although its benets have to be weighed against the ineciency introduced by distortionary nature
of the tax policy. To see it, consider introducing a linear (distortionary) estate tax combined with
the lump-sum tax. If e is the proportional estate tax levy, the relevant budget constraints become15
C1 + B1(1 + e) = y   T ; (6)
C1 + C2 + B2(1 + e) = y   T : (7)
The solution to the consumer's problem yields the indirect utility function w(e;T;y;p). The gov-
ernment's objective is to maximize indirect utility with respect to e and T, subject to the revenue
constraint T + (1   p)eB1 + peB2 = R. In appendix, the following result is demonstrated:
Proposition 3 Starting at e = 0, the estate tax rate should be increased.
The proposition states that introducing a positive estate tax rate (holding revenue constant) in-
creases welfare, at least in some neighborhood of e = 0. The intuition for this result is as follows.
The excess burden of the tax increases with the square of the estate tax rate, and thus it is negligi-
ble for small tax rates. Therefore, the lump-sum approach of Section 3 applies: the only role that
estate taxation plays is the provision of an actuarially fair annuity and therefore it is benecial.
From the proof, it can be seen that it is the implicit annuity that drives this result: the benet
from increasing the estate tax rate at zero is proportional to B1 B2 which, by proposition 1, is the
marginal change in annuity provided by the estate tax (eB1  eB2). Because lump-sum taxation is
feasible, other taxes should be used to the extent that they help to address market imperfections.
4. Are Actual Policies Optimal?
Having established a potential role for estate taxation in providing longevity insurance, one
might ask if this eect is of any importance in practice. The purpose of this section is to tackle this
issue by, (1) using Propositon 1 to quantify the annuity provided by the estate tax, and then by
(2) evaluating the impact of insurance eect on the marginal cost of the estate tax. To accomplish
the second task, I derive and calibrate a necessary rst-order condition characterizing the optimal
general estate tax. The focus is on the tradeo between the benecial eects of insurance that have
been analyzed so far and the eciency loss due to behavioral response.
15Prices of consumption in both periods are normalized to one. This rules out a possibility of imposing an age-
dependent consumption tax. A uniform consumption tax may still be used but it is redundant.{ 11 {
Table 1: Annuity Payments Embedded in the U.S. Estate Tax
Real Interest Rate
3% 4% 5%
1.5 million 3.1-3.7 4.5-6.0 5.9-8.2
Initial estate 5.0 million 43.4-46.0 59.2-65.0 74.8-83.9
10.0 million 98.0-103.0 133.1-144.2 168.0-185.4
The table shows ranges of annuity payments embedded in the streams of estate tax payments of an individual
with a given initial gross estate at age of 50. All annuity payments are in thousands of dollars.
4.1. Converting Actual Estate Taxes to Annuities
Proposition 1 provides a simple method of calculating the annuity embedded in the estate tax:
the implicit annuity payment provided in period s is simply equal to As = (1+r)Es 1 Es. An estate
tax liability that is falling with age, in the present-value sense, corresponds to positive annuities.
Ceteris paribus, annuity payments are higher, the faster wealth decreases in the retirement.
The calculations require assumptions about the shape of wealth proles. In their analysis of
eects of marginal estate tax rates on the size of estates at death, Kopczuk and Slemrod (2001)
regressed the logarithm of gross reported estate on a number of explanatory variables, including age
and age squared. The estimated age prole of gross estates16 is ln(estate) = constant 0:001321
Age + 0:000028696  Age2. I report the results for individuals between ages of 50 and 100; in this
range estates are rising (at an increasing rate) but at rates not exceeding 0.5% per year. Individuals
who are 100 years old have estates that are about 16% higher than those who are 50. I assume that
deductions constitute a constant fraction of estate as taxpayers age (further details of the empirical
procedure are in the appendix). The actual U.S. estate tax rate structure as of 2002 is applied to
this path of wealth to convert it into the path of estate tax liabilities.
Table 1 presents calculations of the annuities embedded in the estate tax while varying two
parameters: the initial (at age 50) level of estate and the interest rate. Annuities are changing over
time both due to the changing slope of the wealth prole and (slightly) due to the progressivity of the
estate tax. For this reason, Table 1 presents ranges of implied annuities received over the remaining
lifetime. They do not, however, vary too much. For individuals with one and a half million dollars
16There is a large literature interested in estimating the shape of wealth proles that typically nds 
at or decreasing
proles (for a survey, see Hurd 1997). However, Kopczuk and Slemrod (2001) is the only paper that explicitly deals
with the population of estate taxpayers and obtains results for gross estates. In the light of the Proposition 1, a
more downward sloping wealth prole corresponds to higher annuities. Therefore, my assumption is likely to be a
conservative one.{ 12 {
of gross at the age of 50, the estate tax implicitly provides an annuity of $3,000 to $8,000 a year. If
there were no behavioral response to estate taxation, this would mean that the estate tax acts like
an increase in Social Security benets of that amount, with an osetting adjustment in the initial
lump-sum tax liability in order to hold the expected present value of revenue constant. For higher
levels of estates, the implied annuity increases both absolutely and proportionally, reaching more
than $100,000 a year for people with initial gross estate of $10,000,000. This is due to the average
tax rate increasing with the size of estate.17 In order to interpret these numbers correctly, recall
that Proposition 1 determines not only annuity payments but also the corresponding initial tax.
The annuity income listed in Table 1 is exactly oset by the initial tax, so that the expected net
present value of tax payments is zero. The numbers in Table 1 re
ect the magnitude of longevity
insurance that is provided, but do not correspond to a net nancial transfer to the estate taxpayers.
Although there is an annuity embedded in the estate tax, it need not be valued by taxpayers.
Valuation of this annuity is analyzed in the following section.
4.2. Marginal Cost of Estate Tax
The linear tax model of Section 3.1 may be easily extended to account for a number of other
important features, and can yield a simple test of the optimality of current policies. Denote the
estate tax schedule by E(B) + eB, where E(B) is some reference estate tax function (e.g., the
actual one) and e is a policy parameter. The problem is to select the optimal level of e. Evaluating
the resulting conditions at e = 0 provides a test of the optimality of the reference tax schedule.18
The optimal estate tax must solve
max
e w(e) + (Z(e) + R(e)); (8)
where w(e) is the indirect utility function, Z(e) is expected estate tax revenue, and R(e) is revenue
from other taxes (which is a function of e because other tax bases will generally be aected by the
choice of the estate tax rate). The individual optimizes subject to a sequence of budget constraints
C0 + (B0   I0) + E(B0) + eB0 = W0 ; (9)
Ci+1 + (Bi+1   Ii+1) + E(Bi+1) + eBi+1 = (1 + r)(Bi   Ii + E(Bi) + eBi) + Ai+1 (10)
17This eect is somewhat toned down by higher deductions at higher estate levels. Note also that it is assumed that
age prole of gross estates does not vary with the size of initial estate and thus it is not responsible for dierences.
18This choice of specication has a practical advantage: the \virtual income" part of the tax at any B does not
depend on e, so that to evaluate the resulting conditions one only needs to know the uncompensated tax elasticity.
One can demonstrate that only functions of the form E(B;e) = E(B) + f(e)B have this property.{ 13 {
where W0 are funds available for consumption in period 0, Ii represents payments conditional on
death at the end of period i, such as life insurance,19 and Ai is any additional income available
if one survives until period i. Ai may include publicly provided Social Security payments, private
annuity income, income from labor supplied in a given period etc., and W0 may be reduced by, e.g.,
any private life insurance or annuity purchases. The right-hand side of equation (10) represents
income available in period i + 1. The consumer has at his disposal funds that would have become
his estate, had he died a period earlier, plus any funds conditional on survival. These resources
have to be allocated between bequests and consumption. The payouts from life insurance increase
bequests, but are not nanced from current funds so that the individual chooses bequests net of life
insurance. These payments are, however, taxable so that the estate tax is due on the estate inclusive
of the life insurance payments.20 These equations generalize constraints given by equations (6)-(7).
One crucial piece of information necessary to characterize the solution to the government's
problem (8) is we: the derivative of the indirect utility function with respect to e. Solving equa-
tions (9)-(10) for consumption in dierent periods, substituting the results into the utility function,










In deriving this expression, the utility function was assumed to be additively separable in consump-
tion, but the instantaneous utility may vary with age, allowing for the possibility of discounting. It
also should be noted that this formula does not depend on whether the variables Ai, Ii and Wi were
exogenous or endogenous, and there well might have been other arguments of the utility function
(such as leisure). It is the envelope theorem that allows to ignore all those other eects.21
Observe that (1 + r)Bi   Bi+1 is the marginal change in the estate tax annuity identied in
Proposition 1. Formula (11) is simply the value of this annuity stream to the individual, and there
is no other eect of the estate tax on the utility of the individual that matters. This conrms
that the analysis up to this point did not miss any important aspect of this tax. In order to fully
19Another interpretation of I is as (minus) tax deductions with B interpreted then as the taxable part of bequest.
20In practice, life insurance proceeds are usually included in the decedent's gross estate. There are exceptions,
however. Bernheim (1987a) argues that life insurance provided as a fringe benet by a corporation may escape estate
taxation. Schmalbeck (2001) describes an estate tax avoidance strategy using insurance trusts.
21To be more explicit, suppose that the instantanous utility was given by ui(C;X) where X is the vector of all
other relevant endogenous variables, possibly including leisure. Allow variables in X to determine W0, A's and I's in
the budget constraint through arbitrary functional forms W0(X), A(X), I(X). As long as the estate tax rate does









All the subsequent analysis of the welfare impact of a change in the estate tax rate also goes through, so that my
calibration of the numerator of equation 15 is not aected by such generalizations.{ 14 {
analyze the optimal estate tax, the eect of estate taxation on the individual utility level has to be
compared with its impact on the tax revenue.
Observe one more result. If annuity markets operate, actual annuity prices provide the in-
formation necessary to evaluate expression (11). More specically, assume that in period zero the
individual may purchase a contingent claim that will pay out $1 in period i conditional on survival,
at the price of pAi, where pAi 
pi
(1+r)i. If pAi =
pi
(1+r)i, the price is actuarially fair. This possibility
is implicitly present in the framework given by equations (9)-(10): purchases of annuities may be
included in W0 and the payouts accounted for in Ai. It is straightforward to show that at the







with equality whenever a positive amount of actuarial claims is purchased. If individuals purchase









(1 + r)Bi 1   Bi

: (13)
Note that this formula does not depend on mortality rates directly, although they are presumably
re
ected in the equilibrium values of pAi's.22 The right-hand side of this formula may be evaluated
empirically. This is the value of the annuity contract identied in Proposition 1 at the actual
market prices of annuities. For the purpose of assessing the optimality of the actual tax system,
evaluation of this formula requires only knowledge of the actual time-pattern of bequests and the
actual annuity prices, both of which are potentially observable. Such calculations are presented
below. It needs to be stressed that this formula applies only when individuals are not constrained in
their annuity choices. Bernheim (1987b) argued that most of the annuity contracts are purchased
through employers, and that most individuals cannot adjust their annuity holdings at the margin.
On the other hand, Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky, and Brown (1999) observe that annuity markets
were rapidly expanding during the 1990s, so that this may no longer be a bad assumption. The
calculations that follow overestimate the value of annuities for people who do not buy annuities.
















As demonstrated above, the rst term is equal to the market value of the annuity contract provided
by the estate tax policy. The term 
u0
0(C0) is the marginal cost of funds when other tax instruments
22Mullin and Philipson (1997) assume no imperfections in the life-insurance market and use the data on prices of
contingent claims to estimate future mortality hazard rates.{ 15 {
are used, so that the second component of the formula is simply the social value of the revenue
collected due to a marginal change in tax policy. The relevant revenue eect has to account not
only for the estate tax revenues, but also for a potential eect of the estate tax rate change on
other sources of revenue.
Equation (14) implies that the marginal cost of funds for the estate tax must at the optimum











 MCF : (15)
When the actual tax system is not optimal, the relationship between MCFe and MCF indicates
whether the estate tax should be increased or decreased: if the marginal cost of using it is lower
than that of the alternative ways of collecting revenue, the estate tax rate should be increased and
vice versa. There are estimates in the literature of the marginal cost of funds for e.g., the income
tax, and they can be compared to the value of MCFe.
4.3. Calibration
The numerator of the MCFe in formula (15) may be evaluated using expression (13). It
requires knowledge of the pattern of annuity prices. Rather than use the empirical path of annuity
prices directly, I rely on the estimates of Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky, and Brown (1999), who
computed the measure of the \money's worth" of annuities. They calculated (presented in their
Table 3) the expected present discounted value of the actual annuity policies' payouts per premium
dollar (which will be denoted by ). Under actuarially fair prices, this should be equal to one: the
whole transaction should have an expected value of zero. When annuities are not fairly priced, this
value is below one. Their maximum estimate of  is 0:927. In terms of prices of annuity claims pAi,
 is assumed to correspond to pAi =  1(1+r) ipi, i.e., the annuity prices being  1 times higher
than the actuarially fair prices. Of course, the mark-up may vary over time, but in this stylized
setting it is convenient to have a single measure of the ineciency of insurance markets.23
Given the initial level of wealth, the age prole of taxable bequests necessary to evaluate
expression (13) is calculated using estimates from Kopczuk and Slemrod (2001) and the actual
23In practice, it is not possible to purchase one-period annuity claims. Instead, individuals have to purchase longer-
term contracts. Provided that an annuity with the pattern implicitly provided by the estate tax can be purchased,
on the margin it should be valued at the actual market price and the approach remains valid. If it is not possible to
construct an analogous annuity using instruments available in the market, no price that could be used to make this
valuation arises and the approach yields only an approximation of the actual benet. There are reasons to believe
that this approach may result in an underestimation of the value of the implicit annuity: estate tax yields a real
annuity and such instruments are not available in the United States (Diamond 1977; Brown, Mitchell, and Poterba
2000) but potentially could be benecial.{ 16 {
estate tax schedule as of 2002, as in Section 4.1. For now, I assume that @R
@e = 0, i.e., that the
estate tax has no eect on revenue from other sources. The denominator of MCFe is then equal
to (when evaluated at e = 0): @Z
@e =
P
(pi   pi+1)(1 + r) i

Bi + E0 @Bi
@e

. Values of Bi follow from
the assumed estate prole and the E0's are the corresponding empirical marginal tax rates. The
strength of the behavioral response, @Bi
@e , can be calculated using the elasticity of estates () with
respect to the tax price (1   E0). The formula is derived in the appendix. Kopczuk and Slemrod
(2001) estimated , and came up with a baseline estimate of 0:094.24
The nal piece of information necessary to calculate the MCFe are mortality rates. Two
alternatives are considered. One is the population life table from the Social Security Administra-
tion (1992). The other one is the annuity life table, based on the mortality experience of pension
plans (Society of Actuaries 2000). The annuity life tables are usually thought to be more rep-
resentative of the mortality experience of the wealthy, because annuitants tend to be wealthier.
The population life tables contain a separate life table for cohorts born every ve years, and the
appropriate cohort life table is used in what follows. The annuity life table is based on the actual
mortality experience between 1990 and 1994, but does not account for the cohort eect. It is used
as is. As reported below, the results are not too sensitive to the choice of mortality rates.
The value of the MCFe is calculated for a male who was 65 years old in 1995. These as-
sumptions match calculations in the Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky, and Brown (1999) study.
Individuals with initial taxable estates of $1.5 million, $5 million and $10 million. The values of
MCFe are calculated for the interest rates of 3% and 5%, net-of-tax elasticities equal to 0:0, 0:094
and 0:3, and three levels of the strength of the annuity market imperfection:  = 1,  = 0:927 and
 = 0:756. The rst value of  corresponds to the case of perfect insurance markets. The other
two values are the highest and the lowest estimate of  from Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky, and
Brown (1999) for 1995.25 Additional details of computations are discussed in the appendix.
The results are reported in Table 2. When  = 1, they represent the upper bound for the
MCFe if individuals are not overannuitized: the annuities are priced at the actuarially fair rates.
Not surprisingly, the MCFe increases with  (i.e., with the strength of behavioral response) and
it decreases as  falls (i.e., the stronger are imperfections in the annuity markets) because the
annuities become more valuable. A higher interest rate reduces the MCFe because it increases the
importance of the future and, therefore, the value of providing annuities. Finally, higher wealth
acts to increase the value of MCFe, re
ecting stronger distortions caused by higher marginal tax
24A positive value corresponds to higher tax rates reducing the estate. When the estate tax elasticity is constant,
the bequest elasticity is a function of the marginal tax rate. For the actual U.S. estate tax rates, it corresponds to
the bequest elasticity of between 0:4 and 0:7.
25The high value of  was calculated using the actuarial life table and the expected rates of return based on the
Treasury bond yield curve, while the low value corresponds to the population life table and the returns based on the
corporate yield curve.{ 17 {
rates. This eect turns out to dominate the eect of providing a bigger annuity. The estimates
are lower when the actuarial life tables are used, but the dierence in results from using the two
mortality assumptions is very small.
When compared to the perfect insurance markets case, the presence of market imperfections
contributes to a reduction in the MCFe by 4-8% for the high value of  and 16-35% for the low
value of . When the empirically based values of parameters are used ( = :094,  < 1), the MCF
does not exceed 2:2 and the estimates of the MCF for the lowest considered level of estate do not
exceed 1:8. The MCF is as low as 1:2 under strong imperfections and the lowest considered level
of estate.26 These values of MCFe are within the range of estimates of the MCF for the income
tax known from the literature that vary between 1.35 and about 3.0.27 Both ranges of estimates
are wide and do not suggests that the estate tax is clearly inferior to other tax instruments present
in the federal tax system.
Table 2 indicates that results depend on the strength of tax leakage eect ("). The evidence
that I relied on pertains to the tax elasticity of gross estates. If deductions are responsive to
marginal tax rate changes, the relevant elasticity is bigger. On the other hand, it is likely that
estate taxation aects the revenue from other sources. To the extent that higher estate tax rates
increase revenue from other sources, the relevant elasticity is lower than assumed. Most importantly,
estate taxation closely interacts with capital income taxes. Bernheim (1987a) argued that when this
eect is accounted for, the net revenue collected by the estate tax is close to zero when compared
to the alternative of removing the estate tax and repealing the step-up of capital gains basis at
death. In other words, the current tax system has a similar impact on revenue as the system that
would use only capital income taxation. This does not, however, provide direct information about
the eect of marginal estate tax rate on capital tax revenue. Estates decreasing with the tax rate (
positive) may correspond to increased tax avoidance, but it may also correspond to a real response.
In particular, it may correspond to substitution toward more lifetime consumption or more leisure.
The rst of these gives rise to more income from sales taxes and also more capital tax revenue as
more capital gains need to be realized. Substitution toward leisure, on the other hand, reduces
labor income taxes. The picture is further complicated by income responses. Therefore, theory
cannot unambiguously establish the sign @R
@e . The complete analysis of the impact of the estate tax
on tax revenue requires further empirical work.
26The population MCF is an average (possibly weighted) of the individual MCF's and the estate tax paying
population (and higher redistributive weights) is concentrated at the lower end of the distribution.
27This is obtained from a linear model of optimal income taxation. The MCF is equal to
1
1  t
1 t", where " is the
elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net-of-tax rate. Most of the studies nd elasticities between :4 and 1.
Recent references in this literature include Auten and Carroll (1999); Gruber and Saez (2002). With the top marginal
income tax rate of 0:39 this corresponds to a MCF between 1:34 and 2:77.{ 18 {
5. Extensions and Conclusions
Estate taxes contain an implicit annuity, which should be welcome when insurance markets
faced by individuals subject to estate taxation are imperfect, as is arguably the case in practice.
Eliminating the tax and replacing it by other taxes designed to collect the same amount of revenue
from the same people may actually reduce the welfare of these individuals, even if the alternative
taxes are completely non-distortionary. If the true goal of a reform is to reduce the burden imposed
on the rich, it may be better achieved by reducing taxes other than the estate tax, so that the
annuities embedded into it are not eliminated.
According to my calibration results, the current estate tax is arguably no more inecient than
the current income tax. This paper does not address, however, another intriguing issue of whether
the estate tax should be a part of the fully optimal tax system, but rather points to its previously
ignored insurance benet that should be taken into account in any such analysis. Given that many
instruments correcting insurance imperfections are possible, one might ask whether estate taxation
can add anything to this arsenal. The answer to this question is likely to depend on the economic
environment and the source of market failure. For example, with binding liquidity or borrowing
constraints, paying for annuities ex post (as with estate taxation) is preferred to paying ex ante (as
with Social Security). Administrative costs of dierent solutions may possibly be dierent. If there
is moral hazard in annuity markets (see, Davies and Kuhn 1992; Philipson and Becker 1998), estate
tax is likely to fare no better than Social Security because it does not address the underlying issue
of endogenous health investments. It is also possible that various insurance instruments should be
simultaneously present in the optimal system. In the earlier version of this paper (Kopczuk 2001),
I showed that both Social Security and estate tax should be used to provide longevity insurance
in a redistributive model with adverse selection in the insurance markets arising due to private
information about mortality. In that context, Social Security cannot insure completely and the
incremental annuity provided by the estate tax is useful.
The analysis has some important consequences for evaluating the eciency of estate taxation.
Usually, ineciency of a tax is measured by the strength of its response to a change in the marginal
tax rate. This is not sucient with estate taxation, because it also provides a benet that other
instruments do not: insurance against longevity. A complete evaluation must then account for
these additional eciency gains. Therefore, analyses of estate taxation that concentrate on its
distortions or its redistributive properties, (e.g., Poterba 2000; Kopczuk and Slemrod 2001) paint
only part of the picture.
One of the implications of the paper is that the routine assumption of conscating accidental
bequests often made when OLG models are simulated is not innocuous. This is especially relevant
when one is interested in simulating eects of Social Security reform, because assumptions about
the treatment of accidental bequests aect the amount of implicit annuitization provided by the tax
code and therefore the benets to other forms of longevity insurance. Further work is required to{ 19 {
understand the importance of such assumptions and other dynamic consequences of estate taxation.
The annuity eect of estate tax likely acts to increase national saving because it leads to an increase
in saving-nanced consumption late in life. Although it seems intuitive that distortionary aspect
of actual estate taxation reduces saving,28 Gale and Perozek (2001) demonstrate that the response
is theoretically ambiguous. At a longer horizon, the distribution of wealth will also be aected by
estate taxation (see e.g., Stiglitz 1978).
Although this paper has addressed estate taxation, there are other taxes that interact with
life-long nancial security. For example, the sales tax is conditional on being alive (the opposite of
estate taxation), and therefore it aggravates the problems caused by imperfect insurance markets.
Unlike the estate tax, sales tax aects the whole population. Other taxes, such as annual wealth
taxes are neutral with respect to this problem, because they are imposed regardless of the resolution
of uncertainty. A similar argument applies to labor income taxation: most of the income subject to
this tax is earned during the working years, when mortality rates are very low. The key observation
of this paper is that lifetime taxes falling with the realized length of life provide an annuity. This
argument should be weighed against a more standard view that taxes occurring late in life are
preferred because young people are more likely to be subject to borrowing constraints. Depending
on the strength of imperfections in the annuity markets, the insurance considerations may play an
important role in determining the optimal structure of taxation.
28Empirical results of Kopczuk and Slemrod (2001) appear to indicate so. However the behavioral response that
they nd is the response of reported gross estate. In the presence of tax avoidance, it need not be the same as
response of wealth accumulation.{ 20 {
A. Appendix
Lemma 1. Proof: Suppose that the consumption/bequest paths before period s are identical.
Consider choosing the same consumption in period s in both cases. Conditional on death in period
s, the tax of Es is due in both cases. Therefore, bequests conditional on having died in period s are
identical. Conditional on having survived until period s + 1, the present value of the tax liability
is zero in each case. Therefore, resources available at the beginning of period s + 1 are identical in
each case and the identical consumption/bequest plans can be implemented from that point on. 2
Proposition 3. Proof: The individual constraints can be used to solve for C1 and C2, so that the
problem of the individual is to maximize
u(y   T   B1(1 + e)) + (1   p)v(B1) + pv(B2) + pu((1 + e)(B1   B2)):
with respect to B1 and B2. By the envelope theorem, we =  B1u0(C1) + p(B1   B2)u0(C2) and
wT =  u0(C1). Dene X  (1   p)B1 + pB2, so that the revenue constraint is T + eX = R.
Note that the government's problem may be expressed as unconstrained maximization with
respect to e, with T(e) implicitly dened by the revenue constraint. It is straightforward to show














Locally, if this expression is positive, the estate tax rate should be increased. Evaluate it at e = 0
and normalize dividing by always positive u0(C1). Then, it reduces to p(B1   B2)(
   1). The
individual rst-order conditions are
(1   p)v0(B1) + (1 + e)(pu0(C2)   u0(C1)) = 0;
pv0(B2)   (1 + e)pu0(C2) = 0:











If B1 > B2, then 
 > 1, and if B1 < B2,29 then 
 < 1 so that p(B1  B2)(
  1) is always positive.
Therefore, the estate tax rate should be increased. Note that this immediately implies that there
is a local maximum with e > 0 (possibly at a corner e = 1), but it does not rule out the possibility
of a local maximum with e < 0. 2
Formula for Bequest Elasticity. Denote the total estate at age i by Si = Bi+E(Bi)+eBi. This





1+E0. Kopczuk and Slemrod (2001)
29Constraints (6) and (7) imply that B1 > B2, but the proposition does not rely on this. It would still apply if
individuals were overannuitized, with the estate tax inducing a negative annuity.{ 21 {













@E0. Note that @S
@E0 = @S
@e and @S
@x =   @S
@(1 x), so that @S
@e =  (1   x)S. Consequently,
Bi + E0 @Bi
@e =  x(1   x)S + (1   x)B. Here x is the (empirical) estate tax rate and  is the
elasticity as estimated by Kopczuk and Slemrod (2001).
Empirical Assumptions. Estate tax structure as of 2002 is used.30 If taxable estate is below $1
million, no tax is due. The initial marginal tax rate is 41%, and it quickly rises to the maximum
value of 50% at $2.5 million level. I assume that the share of deductions in gross estate does not
change with age. This assumption also implies that the elasticity of gross estate is equal to the
elasticity of taxable estate. In computation of MCFe, B + E(B) is taken to be equal to gross
estate net of tax deductions. As explained in footnotes 19 and 21, the derivation of MCFe is not
aected by such reinterpretation. The following shares of deductions are used for $1, $5 and $10
million initial gross estates: 11:53%, 14:66% and 18:83%, respectively. These numbers correspond
to shares of deductions on the tax returns led in 1998 for single or widowed taxpayers in gross
estate brackets of $1 $5 million, $5 $10 million and $10 $20 million. This information is based on
unpublished tabulations provided by Barry Johnson of the IRS. Widowed or single taxpayers were
selected because in the same data 59% of estates of married individuals is transferred tax free to
their spouses using unlimited marital deductions. Spousal transfers are likely subject to taxation at
death of the surviving spouse so that it is inappropriate to treat them as non-taxable. See Johnson,
Mikow, and Eller (2001) for descriptive statistics related to the composition of estates, and Kopczuk
and Slemrod (2002) for a discussion of marital deductions. Changes in deduction parameter that
leave individuals in the same tax bracket have very little eect on MCFe. They aect the size of
annuity mechanically by changing the level of tax liability. Ideally one should use the age prole of
taxable estates without making any assumptions regarding deductions. However, such information
is not available. Note that if the true gross estate prole is 
at (as assumed in the paper), the
evidence of deductions falling with gross estate contains no information about age eects. If the
share of deductions is increasing with age, tax liability falls more quickly than implied by my
assumptions and I underestimate the size of annuity and overestimate MCFe. On the other hand,
if tax deductions respond to marginal tax rates, the true behavioral response is stronger and MCFe
is underestimated.
30In the earlier version of this paper (Kopczuk 2001), tax structure as of 1999 was used. This is the main source
of numerical dierences in results. The qualitative conclusions are not aected.{ 22 {
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Table 2. Value of the Marginal Cost of Funds for the Estate Tax
: 0:0 0:094 0:3
Interest rate: 3% 5% 3% 5% 3% 5%
Mortality Rates From the Actuarial Life Table
 = 1:000
$1.5 million 1.755 1.755 1.839 1.839 2.055 2.054
$5.0 million 2.000 2.000 2.162 2.162 2.628 2.627
$10.0 million 2.000 2.000 2.181 2.181 2.719 2.719
 = 0:927
$1.5 million 1.677 1.606 1.757 1.683 1.963 1.881
$5.0 million 1.913 1.833 2.068 1.981 2.513 2.408
$10.0 million 1.914 1.834 2.087 2.000 2.602 2.493
 = 0:756
$1.5 million 1.435 1.147 1.504 1.202 1.681 1.343
$5.0 million 1.643 1.316 1.776 1.423 2.159 1.729
$10.0 million 1.647 1.321 1.796 1.440 2.239 1.796
Mortality Rates from the Population Life Table
 = 1:000
$1.5 million 1.755 1.755 1.839 1.838 2.054 2.054
$5.0 million 2.000 2.000 2.162 2.162 2.627 2.626
$10.0 million 2.000 2.000 2.181 2.180 2.719 2.718
 = 0:927
$1.5 million 1.686 1.627 1.766 1.705 1.973 1.904
$5.0 million 1.923 1.856 2.078 2.006 2.526 2.437
$10.0 million 1.924 1.857 2.097 2.025 2.615 2.524
 = 0:756
$1.5 million 1.472 1.231 1.542 1.290 1.723 1.441
$5.0 million 1.683 1.410 1.819 1.524 2.211 1.852
$10.0 million 1.687 1.414 1.839 1.542 2.293 1.922
Table contains calibrated values of MCFe under dierent mortality
assumptions for individuals with initial (at age 65) gross estates of $1.5,
$5 and $10 million, for dierent levels of the interest rate, tax elasticity
of estates (") and strengths of imperfections in the annuity markets ().